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NOTE
Hindsight 20/20: Missouri’s Use of Statutory
Interpretation as a Key Insight for Future
Litigation
Missouri State Conference of Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored
People v. State, 607 S.W.3d 728 (Mo. 2020).
Mackenzie L. Stout*

I. INTRODUCTION
In Missouri State Conference of Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of
Colored People v. State (hereinafter “NAACP v. State”), the Supreme
Court of Missouri interpreted a Missouri statute that expanded the right to
vote absentee in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.1 The new
provision allowed all registered Missouri voters to vote absentee during
the 2020 elections but required most absentee voters to have their ballots
notarized.2 Voters who were “confined due to illness” or qualified as part
of an “at-risk” category, however, were not required to have their ballots
notarized.3 Appellants challenged the bill, claiming that voluntarily
confining oneself as a precautionary measure and in accordance with
social distancing guidelines was a form of “confinement due to illness,”
which would permit valid absentee voting without requiring the
certification of a notary.4 Appellants also argued that requiring
notarization for individuals that do not fall into the enumerated categories
infringed on their fundamental right to vote under the Missouri
Constitution.5 The Supreme Court of Missouri employed various methods
*

B.S.B.A., University of Missouri, 2019; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri
School of Law, 2022; Editor-in-Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2021–2022; Associate
Member, Missouri Law Review, 2020–2021. I am grateful to Professor Thomas
Bennett for his insight, guidance, and support during the writing of this Note, as well
as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process.
1
Missouri State Conf. of Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People v.
State, 607 S.W.3d 728, 734 (Mo. 2020) (en banc) [hereinafter NAACP v. State].
2
Id. at 731.
3
Id. at 731.
4
Id. at 732.
5
Id. at 734.
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of statutory interpretation to determine when individuals are “confined due
to illness” and how enacted safety and social distancing measures affect
the Constitutional right to vote.6 The decision in NAACP v. State provides
insight into the Supreme Court of Missouri’s interpretation of legislative
action in response to emergency situations.7
This Note analyzes the Supreme Court of Missouri’s approach to
statutory interpretation and provides insight into the value the Court places
on different canons of interpretation. Part II describes the facts and
holding of NAACP v. State. Part III analyzes various states’ voting
statutes and legislative responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic.
Additionally, Part III details the canons of interpretation the Supreme
Court of Missouri has previously used in its decisions. Part IV explains
the decision in NAACP v. State. Finally, Part V comments on the
newfound clarity this decision provides and explains the court’s
preferences regarding statutory interpretation revealed in this holding – a
finding that will be valuable for future litigation.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Missouri voting laws have long recognized the importance of
absentee voting for individuals who cannot – or should not – be present at
the polls on Election Day. 8 However, the law historically limited the
ability to vote absentee to categories of individuals enumerated in Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 115.277.9 Relevant here, § 115.227.1(2) permits a registered
Missouri voter to vote by absentee ballot if such voter “expects to be
prevented from going to the polls to vote on Election Day due to:
incapacity or confinement due to illness or physical disability, including a
person who is primarily responsible for the physical care of a person who
is incapacitated or confined due to illness or disability.”10
In March 2020, a novel virus, COVID-19, swept the United States.11
The state of Missouri had high rates of infection, which increased during
the spring of 2020.12 As a result, Missouri voters became concerned about
their ability to vote in the highly anticipated and strongly contested
6

Id. at 732.
Id. at 732.
8
Id. at 733–34.
9
Id.
10
MO. REV. STAT. § 115.277.1 (2020). Under § 115.277.1, Missouri voters may
also vote absentee if expected to be prevented from being able to vote at the polls due
to: Absence from voting jurisdiction on Election Day; Religious belief or practice;
Employment as an election authority; Incarceration, provided that all qualifications
for voting are retained; or certified participation in address confidentiality program.
Id.
11
NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 734.
12
Id.
7
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presidential election in November 2020.13 In response to this growing
concern, the Missouri Senate passed Senate Bill 631, which expanded
eligibility for absentee voting without the requirement of a notary
certification.14 This bill, § 115.277.1(7), permitted absentee voting
without a notary’s signature “[f]or an election that occurs during the year
2020,” when “the voter has contracted or is an at-risk category for
contracting or transmitting severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus.”15 Section 115.277 further defined the “at-risk” categories of
individuals to include voters who:
(1) Are sixty-five years of age or older; (2) Live in a long-term care
facility licensed under chapter 198; (3) Have chronic lung disease or
moderate to severe asthma; (4) Have serious heart conditions; (5) Are
immunocompromised; (6) Have diabetes; (7) Have chronic kidney
disease and are undergoing dialysis; or (8) Have liver disease.16

In addition to expanding eligibility for absentee voting without a
notary’s acknowledgment under § 115.277.1(7), Senate Bill 631 also
created a new section, § 115.302.1, which allowed any registered Missouri
elector to vote absentee for any remaining 2020 election if a notary or other
official authorized their ballot.17
Despite the expansion of absentee voting during the 2020 elections,
Appellants in NAACP v. State argued the notary or public authorization
requirement created a public health risk during the COVID-19 pandemic
because it required close contact between prospective voters and
authorizing agents.18 Doctors and professors of epidemiology filed an
amicus brief which explained the infectiousness of COVID-19, the risks
the virus posed to all individuals – especially those in a high-risk category

13

Id. at 729.
S.B. 631, 100th Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess. § 7 (Mo. 2020).
15
MO. REV. STAT. § 115.277(7) (2020) (emphasis added).
16
S.B. 631, 100th Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess. § 115.277 (Mo. 2020) (“115.302. 1.
Any registered voter of this state may cast a mail-in ballot as provided in this section.
Nothing in this section shall prevent a voter from casting an absentee ballot, provided
such person has not cast a ballot pursuant to this section. Application for a mail-inballot may be made by the applicant in person, or by United States mail, or on behalf
of the applicant by his or her guardian or relative within the second degree of
consanguinity or affinity.”).
17
See MO. REV. STAT. § 115.302.11 (2020) (“The statement . . . shall be
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public or other officer authorized by law to
administer oaths”).
18
NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 732; Social Distancing, CDC (Nov. 17, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/socialdistancing.html [https://perma.cc/9PQC-BE2Y].
14
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– and the fear that that in-person voting on Election Day could cause an
increase in the spread of the virus.19
The Supreme Court of Missouri heard the case pursuant to Article V
§ 3 of the Missouri Constitution. 20 The NAACP, the League of Women
Voters of Missouri, Meredith Langlitz, and Javier A. Del Vilar
(collectively “Appellants”) appealed the circuit court’s denial of
declaratory and injunctive relief.21 Appellants filed their original claim in
April 2020.22 The State of Missouri moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.23 The circuit court granted the
State’s motion,24 and Appellants timely appealed.25 While the appeal was
pending, Senate Bill 631 passed the Missouri Legislature.26 In light of the
new bill, the Supreme Court of Missouri remanded the case to the circuit
court.27 The parties exchanged discovery, and the case was tried on the
merits to consider the effect of the new legislation.28 The circuit court
entered judgment on two counts.29 First, the court found, under Count I,
as a matter of statutory interpretation, voters who voluntarily choose to
confine themselves on Election Day due to fear of contracting COVID-19
are not “confine[d] due to illness or disability” within the plain and
ordinary meaning of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.277(2).30 Second, under Count
II, the circuit court held that Appellants’ argument that the notary
requirement presented unconstitutional health risks was unsupported by
law and evidence.31
Appellants raised challenges to the circuit court’s ruling on Counts I
and II.32 First, regarding Count I, Appellants argued § 115.277(2) “permits
registered voters who expect to confine themselves on Election Day due
to COVID-19 to vote absentee in Missouri without a notary seal.”33
19

Brief for Doctors and Professors of Epidemiology as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellants at 26–27, NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d 728 (No. SC98744) 2020 WL
7260901.
20
MO. CONST. art. V, § 3 (“The supreme court shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction in all cases involving the validity of … a statute or provision of the
constitution of this state”).
21
NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 729.
22
Id. at 730.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 731.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 731, 734.
33
Id. at 731.
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Appellants claimed that confinement due to illness during the COVID-19
pandemic includes voters who voluntarily stay home to avoid spreading
or contracting the virus regardless of whether the voter expects to be ill or
actually have contracted the virus on Election Day.34 Therefore,
Appellants argued that since these voters are “confined due to illness”
within the meaning of § 115.277.1(2), they should be permitted to vote
absentee without the requirement of a notary acknowledgement.35 The
State responded by arguing that voters who voluntarily choose to confine
themselves, but do not actually expect to be ill on Election Day, are not
“confined” within the meaning of § 115.277.1(2); therefore, voters who
voluntarily confine themselves would require a notary acknowledgment
for their ballot.36 To support its conclusion, the State explained the plain
and ordinary meaning of the words “illness” and “confinement” as stated
in § 115.277.1(2) would not include voluntary confinement.37 The State
argued a person would not say they are “confined” due to illness if they
were not actually ill; instead, the individual would say they are “confined
due to the fear of illness.” 38 Further, the State pointed out this additional
phrase is omitted from the statute, evidencing the legislature’s intent to
require an actual illness.39 Similarly, the State argued Webster’s
dictionary definition of “confinement” required “restraint.”40 This
“restraint” element means that the illness must cause the confinement, not
an individual’s willing decision.41
The State also argued the “expectation” requirement did not apply to
voluntary confinement under a separate statute, § 115.287.2, which
provides for situations where an individual “becomes confined due to
illness or injury, an election authority will deliver a ballot, witness the
signing, and return the absentee ballot.”42 Finally, the State argued that
permitting voluntary confinement to constitute “confinement due to
illness” would render § 115.277.1(7), enacted under Senate Bill 631,
superfluous.43 The State argued § 115.277.1(7) addressed situations where
“at-risk” individuals could vote absentee, without a notary, in order to
protect themselves from significant health risks.44 Therefore, if §

34

Id.
Id.
36
Id. at 734.
37
Brief for Respondents at 39, NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d 728 (No. SC98536).
38
NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 730.
39
Id. at 38.
40
Brief for Respondents, supra note 37, at 59.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 66.
43
Id. at 67.
44
Id. at 61.
35
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115.277.1(2) already included voluntary confinement, this new provision
would have been redundant.45
Regarding Count II, Appellants argued the circuit court erred when it
held that requiring voters to obtain a notary acknowledgement during the
COVID-19 pandemic was not a constitutional violation.46 The circuit
court initially questioned whether any level of scrutiny applied to the
alleged constitutional violation and then determined the notary
requirement was “subject, at most, to rational-basis scrutiny.”47
Appellants argued the enforcement of statutes that prevent all voters from
casting an absentee ballot without acknowledgment by a notary during the
COVID-19 pandemic created a severe burden on their fundamental right
to vote because of the health risks created by the close interaction between
voters and notaries.48 Additionally, as additional burdens, Appellants
pointed to the length of waiting time required to see a notary, taking
transportation to get to the notary, and the low number of notaries offering
services.49 Further, Appellants argued the photo identification requirement
required by a notary is much more stringent than that of poll voting. 50 Due
to the allegedly severe burden imposed by requiring a notary for all
individuals voluntarily confining themselves to avoid spreading or
contracting COVID-19, Appellants believed strict scrutiny should apply. 51
Applying strict scrutiny, Appellants asserted the notary provision was not
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest and was therefore
unconstitutional.52
To counter these arguments, the State claimed that requiring all
voters who do not qualify under an enumerated “at-risk” category –
including those voluntarily confining themselves – to receive a notary
acknowledgment does not impose a severe burden on Missouri citizens’
fundamental right to vote.53 The State asserted the alleged health risks of
requiring a notary during the COVID-19 pandemic did not impose a severe
burden and cited the circuit court’s factual finding that the risk of
45

Id. at 60–61.
NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 734.
47
Brief for Appellants at 61, NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d 728 (No. SC98744).
48
NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 734.
49
Brief for Appellants, supra note 47, at 17. Appellants cited that only 34.6
percent of responding Missouri notaries are available for the month of November. Id.
50
Id. at 18. For example, the Missouri notary public handbook, created by the
Secretary of State, states “[t]he best form of identification is one that includes a
photograph and signature. A valid driver’s license is a good source of identification.”
Id. at 17–18. Comparatively, acceptable identification for poll voting includes military
IDs, passports, Missouri driver’s licenses and non-driver licenses, voter registration
cards, IDs from a Missouri university, utility bills, and paychecks. Id.
51
NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 734.
52
Brief for Appellants, supra note 47, at 61.
53
NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 734.
46
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contracting COVID-19 from getting a ballot notarized is very low.54
Mitigation measures such as social distancing, masks, and hand hygiene
could reduce any remaining risks present from requiring voters to secure
a notary acknowledgement.55 Further, the State argued that the “alleged
notary scarcity” did not create a severe burden because there were tens of
thousands of notaries available throughout the state during a six-week
interval.56 The State also claimed that Appellants misrepresented the
photo ID requirement because notaries permit alternatives to photo
identification, including verification by others who know the voter.57
Lastly, because the State claimed the statutory notary requirement did
not impose a “severe burden,” it argued the court should defer to the
legislature and examine the law using a rational-basis review.58 However,
should the court decide to employ strict scrutiny, the State presented
evidence proving the notary requirement was still valid because it was
“precisely tailored to advance the State’s compelling interests in
preventing election and voter fraud and protecting the integrity of Missouri
elections.”59
Reviewing the lower court’s judgment de novo, under Count I, the
Supreme Court of Missouri held that the plain and ordinary meaning of §
115.277.1(2) does not include individuals who voluntarily confine
themselves to avoid contracting or spreading the virus. Under Count II, the
court held the statute was constitutional because absentee voting is a
privilege, not a fundamental right. Legislatures, therefore, may pass
provisions, such as Senate Bill 631, which create special conditions to
protect this privilege.60

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This Part discusses two distinct matters which combined to influence
the court’s decision in NAACP v. State. First, subpart A discusses various
changes to voting procedures states employed for the 2020 election season
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, subpart B explains how
54

Brief for Respondents, supra note 37, at 84–85.
Id. at 87–88.
56
Id. at 88–93 (highlighting that no named Plaintiffs alleged he or she had
difficulty locating a notary and none claimed that the time and transportation to obtain
a notary presented a severe burden).
57
Id. at 27–28.
58
Id. at 97.
59
Id. at 100–02. To support its compelling interest of preventing voter fraud,
Respondent cites several sources which claim fraud is common among absentee
ballots including, but not limited to former United States and Missouri case precedent;
United States Department of Justice Public Integrity Manual; Federal Bureau of
Investigation task force documents; trial presentation of fraud investigators. Id.
60
NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 731–34.
55
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the Supreme Court of Missouri has applied the rules of statutory
interpretation in its prior decisions.

A. Changes to State Voting Laws and Procedures for the 2020
Elections
The 2020 election season brought unique challenges as states
adjusted voting procedures to encourage safe voter participation. 61
Individual states enacted special policies to expand absentee voting while
still ensuring the integrity of the process.62 For example, states employed
varying procedures to authenticate signatures on absentee ballots.63
Thirty-one states used a “signature verification” process where election
officials compared the signature on the ballot with a signature already on
file for the individual, typically, the voter registration record.64 Six states
verified that a signature was present on an absentee or mailed ballot but
did not conduct a separate signature verification.65 Eight states required
the signature of a witness who was present when the voter signed the
absentee ballot.66 Missouri, along with Mississippi and Oklahoma,
required the absentee ballot to be notarized.67 Arkansas mandated that a
copy of the voter’s ID must be returned with the mailed absentee ballot,
and Alabama required a copy of the voter’s ID along with signatures from
a notary or two witnesses.68

61

Elizabeth Williams, Annotation, COVID-19 Related Litigation: Challenges to
Election and Voting Practices During COVID-19 Pandemic, 54 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art.
3 (2020).
62
Voting Outside the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail and other Voting at
Home
Options,
NAT’L
CONF.
OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-earlyvoting.aspx#permit [https://perma.cc/L57H-4AT3] (last visited Mar. 3, 2021).
63
Id.
64
Id. States using signature verification included: Arizona, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia. See id.
65
Id. (Connecticut, District of Columbia, Iowa, Maryland, New Mexico,
Vermont, and Wyoming).
66
Id. A witness signature was required in Alaska (witness or notary), Louisiana,
Minnesota (witness or notary), North Carolina (two witnesses or a notary), Rhode
Island (two witnesses or a notary), South Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. See
also League of Women Voters of Va. v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 458 F. Supp. 3d
442 (W.D. Va. 2020) (injunction issued to override signature requirement for 2020
election).
67
Id.
68
Id.
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Across the country, states used varying approaches to adjust their
voting procedures in response to COVID-19.69 While some states retained
their traditional, stringent requirements,70 other states tailored voting laws
for the COVID-19 pandemic.71 For example, Delaware reinterpreted its
absentee ballot-statute statute to clarify that “sick or physically disabled”
as used in that provision included any voter who was “asymptomatic with
COVID-19 or otherwise abiding by Center for Disease Control
recommendations and voluntarily quarantining.”72 Additionally, West
Virginia adopted a clarifying regulation which stated, “in light of the
COVID-19 crisis, ‘confined’ means ‘a person who is restricted to a
specific location for reasons beyond that person's control, including a
recommendation by state or federal authorities for the person to selfquarantine, avoid public places or contact with other persons.’”73

B. The Supreme Court of Missouri’s Preferred Canons of
Interpretation
The Missouri Legislature passed Senate Bill 631 but did not specify
how the phrase “confined due to illness” would apply to voluntary
confinement based on CDC recommendations or attempts to prevent the
spread of COVID-19.74 This ambiguity required the Supreme Court of
Missouri to interpret and clarify the language in the statute.75 Historically,
the Supreme Court of Missouri has favored certain canons of statutory
construction to resolve disputes.76 First, the court looks to legislative
intent as reflected in the “plain and ordinary language” of the statute.77
Emphasizing its preference for this mode of interpretation, the court has

69

Id.
See, e.g., Griswold v. Ferrigno Warren, 462 P.3d 1081, 1086 (Colo. 2020)
(explaining that Colorado required Senate candidates to receive the same number of
petition signatures despite limits due to quarantine guidelines and social distancing).
71
NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 744 (Stith, J., concurring) (citing Sixth
Modification of the Declaration of a State of Emergency for the State of Delaware
Due to a Public Health Threat (Mar. 24, 2020), https://governor.delaware.gov/wpcontent/uploads/sites/24/2020/03/Sixth-Modification-to-State-of-Emergency03242020.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9F7-XWMN]).
72
Id.
73
W. VA. CODE § 15-53-2 (2020).
74
Brief for Respondents, supra note 37, at 37.
75
NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 731–34.
76
See infra notes 77–83 and accompanying text.
77
Parktown Imports, Inc. v. Audi of Am., Inc., 278 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Mo. 2009)
(en banc); Dickemann v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 550 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Mo. 2018) (en
banc) (quoting Wolff Shoe Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 762 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo. 1988) (en
banc)).
70
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referred to other methods as “merely an aid” in interpretation. 78 Second,
the court has looked to the historical interpretation of a word as determined
by other Missouri courts.79 If the reading of a statute is a “close call,” and
one interpretation violates the Constitution while the other does not, the
court favors the constitutionally valid interpretation.80 The court refrains
from inserting words into a statute to protect the separation of powers
between the judiciary and the legislature.81 Further acknowledging this
necessary separation of power, the court has recognized that the legislature
does not enact superfluous provisions and instead has endeavored to give
effect to each word.82 Lastly, the court recognizes the importance of
reading a contested statute as a whole and construing individual portions
together.83

IV. INSTANT DECISION
Part IV describes the court’s analysis in reaching its decision
regarding the interpretation of § 115.277.1.84 It explains the per curiam
decision in addition to Judge Wilson’s concurrence and Judge Stith’s
concurrence in part and dissent in part.

A. The Court’s Interpretation of § 115.277.1(2)
The court recognized the arguments presented by Appellants and the
State regarding the meaning of “confinement due to illness” as stated in §
115.277.1(2) and whether Appellants’ voluntary confinement due to the
potential spread or contraction of COVID-19 fell within the meaning of
the phrase.85 To begin its analysis of the meaning of the disputed provision,
the court acknowledged the ultimate goal of statutory interpretation is to
78

Parktown Imports, Inc., 278 S.W.3d at 672; Dickemann, 550 S.W.3d at
68 (quoting Wolff Shoe Co., 762 S.W.2d at 31).
79
Kieffer v. Kieffer, 590 S.W.2d 915, 918 (Mo. 1979) (en banc); Short v. S.
Union Co., 372 S.W.3d 520, 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (researching how word
“including” has been used in prior Missouri cases).
80
Spradlin v. City of Fulton, 924 S.W.2d 259, 263 (Mo. 1996) (en banc).
81
See, e.g., Turner v. Sch. Dist. Of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660, 668 (Mo. 2010)
(en banc) (“[T]he Court cannot supply what the legislature has omitted from
controlling statutes.”).
82
Alberici Constructors, Inc. v. Dir. Of Revenue, 452 S.W.3d 632, 638 (Mo.
1993) (en banc) (quoting Hyde Park Hous. P’ship v. Dir. Of Revenue, 850 S.W.2d 82,
84 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); Mantia v. Missouri Dep't of Transp., 529 S.W.3d 804, 809
(Mo. 2017) (en banc); see also In re Verified Application & Petition of Liberty Energy
(Midstates) Corp., 464 S.W.3d 520, 525 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).
83
Dickemann, 550 S.W.3d at 68 (quoting Wollard v. City of Kan. City, 831
S.W.2d 200, 203 (Mo. 1992) (en banc)).
84
MO. REV. STAT. § 115.277.1 (2020).
85
NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 732–33.
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“ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used [and] to give
effect to that intent if possible[.]”86 To decipher the legislature’s intent,
the court stated it must “consider the words used in their plain and ordinary
meaning.”87
The court determined the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute
did not include voters who voluntarily confine themselves to avoid
contracting or spreading COVID-19.88 The court looked to the definition
of “illness” and “confinement” in Webster’s dictionary.89 Webster’s
defines “illness” as “an unhealthy condition of body or mind.” 90 Utilizing
this definition, the court determined “illness” means a person who actually
has a diagnosis or is experiencing symptoms, not a person under threat of
such conditions.91 The court stated Appellant’s definition of “confinement
due to illness” would require the court to read in “confinement due to the
fear of illness,” which violates a clear guideline of statutory interpretation
– the court cannot insert words or express meaning beyond what is stated
in the statute.92 The court cited its precedent of limiting its own power
when reviewing statutes to uphold the separation of powers among the
branches of government.93 The court reiterated this commitment,
concluding, “This Court should not second-guess the wisdom or policy of
a legislative enactment.”94
The court turned to another canon to solidify its determination – a
court must presume legislatures did not enact meaningless provisions.95
As explained by the court, Appellants’ argument failed in two ways.96
First, Appellants’ interpretation of “confinement due to illness” would
render the second portion of § 115.277.1(2) superfluous.97
If
“confinement due to illness” already included those voluntary confining
for fear of contracting or spreading an illness, there would be no purpose

86

Id. at 732 (citing Wolff Shoe Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 762 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo.
1988) (en banc)).
87
Id. at 732 (citing Dickemann, 550 S.W.3d at 68).
88
Id. at 732–33.
89
Illness, Merriam-Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary (3d ed. 2002); NAACP v.
State, 607 S.W.3d at 732.
90
NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 732–33.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 733.
93
Id. at 732–33. See also Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660, 668
(Mo. 2010) (en banc); Bd. of Educ. of City of St. Louis v. State, 47 S.W.3d 366, 371
(Mo. 2001) (en banc).
94
NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 733; State ex rel. Voss v. Davis, 418 S.W.2d
163, 169 (Mo. 1967) (Courts may not “inquire into the motive, policy, wisdom, or
expediency of legislation.”).
95
NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 733.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 733–34.
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in including the secondary provision permitting caretakers of those who
are “confined due to illness” to vote absentee without notary’s
authorization.98 Second, the court explained, the new statutory provision,
§ 115.277.1(7), enacted under Senate Bill 631, would also be rendered
superfluous.99 Under Appellants’ interpretation, “at-risk voters” would
already be voluntarily confined within the meaning of § 115.277.1(2).
Therefore, the court stated Appellants’ interpretation failed because part
of subsection (2) and the entirety of subsection (7) would be
superfluous.100 The court emphasized legislative changes as “highly
instructive” to the statute’s meaning.101 The legislature’s amendment to
include subsection (7) as an additional provision in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic was not only telling, the court stated, it was
“dispositive.”102

B. Constitutional Claims
The court identified a key issue in dispute between the parties –
whether preventing all absentee voters in Missouri from having the right
to vote without a notary acknowledgment on a mail-in ballot violates their
fundamental right to vote under the Missouri Constitution.103 The court
acknowledged that under Article I, Section 25 of the Missouri
Constitution, the right to vote is fundamental to all Missouri citizens.104
However, the court distinguished the right to vote from absentee voting,
holding that the latter does not carry the same fundamental privilege.
Pointing to Article VIII, Section 7, the court explained the Missouri
Constitution empowers the legislature to “authorize voting for those who
are absent.”105 Notably, Article VIII, Section 7 states that “qualified
electors of the state who are absent, whether within or without the state,

98

Id.
Id. at 734.
100
Id.
101
Id.; Cox v. Dir. of Revenue, 98 S.W.3d 548, 550 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
102
NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 734.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 734–35; MO. CONST. art. I § 25 (“[a]ll elections shall be free and open;
and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise
of the right of suffrage.” Additionally, Article VIII, Section 2 provides, in part, “All
citizens of the United States ... over the age of eighteen who are residents of this state
and of the political subdivision in which they offer to vote are entitled to vote at all
elections by the people. . . .”); Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 211 (Mo. 2006)
(en banc).
105
MO. CONST. art. VIII § 7 (“Qualified electors of the state who are absent,
whether within or without the state, may be enabled by general law to vote at all
elections by the people.”); NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 735.
99
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may be enabled by general law to vote at all elections by the people”106
The court focused on the word “may” and decided, based on the word’s
plain and ordinary meaning, the legislature has the discretion to permit
absentee voting under conditions it provides.107 Ultimately, the court
concluded Article VIII, Section 7 applies to both absentee and mail-in
ballots because voters who cast a mail-in ballot are similarly “absent” from
the poll.108
After concluding the right to vote absentee is not fundamental and is
instead provided at the will of the legislature, the court stated the Missouri
Legislature exercised its constitutional authority in passing Senate Bill
631.109 The court affirmed the notary requirement included in the bill as a
valid “safeguard to protect the ‘privilege’ of absentee voting.” 110 To
bolster this reasoning, the court looked to history and explained that the
Missouri Legislature had exercised its discretion to allow absentee voting
for more than 100 years, and the safeguards employed for COVID-19
complied with this exercise of constitutional power. 111

C. Judge Wilson’s Concurrence
Judge Wilson concurred that § 115.277(2) does not allow Missouri
voters who voluntarily confine themselves to cast an absentee ballot
without a notary.112 He added, however, that Senate Bill 631 should have
provided this right.113 Judge Wilson emphasized that Appellants focused
their attention on the wrong part of § 115.277.1.114 Appellants, he noted,
should have focused on the word “expects,” as stated in the statute, instead
of concentrating on the phrase “due to illness.”115 By focusing on the
expectation element, Judge Wilson argued, a voter would need only an
“expect[ation]” – a genuine yet entirely subjective belief – that they may
be confined on Election Day due to COVID-19, not that they actually will
be confined.116 Shifting this focus would allow a Missouri voter who
106

NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 735.
Id. (citing State ex rel. Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Ruddy, 592 S.W.2d 789, 794
(Mo. 1980) (en banc) (“The plain and ordinary meaning of the word ‘may’ is
permissive.”).
108
NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 735.
109
Id. at 729.
110
Id. at 735.
111
Id. at 735–36. Before dismissing Appellants’ constitutional claim, the court
clarified that Appellants specifically stated they do not challenge the new absentee
and mail-in ballot statutes on any other constitutional grounds. Id. at 736.
112
Id. (Wilson, J., concurring).
113
Id. at 737.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 737–38.
107
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“expects” to be confined on Election Day based on a genuinely held,
subjective belief to vote absentee without a notary within the meaning of
§ 115.277.1(2).117 In addition, Judge Wilson noted the high prevalence of
COVID-19 in Missouri at the time of the court’s opinion, which further
justified a voter’s belief that they might contract this highly contagious
virus, and therefore “expecting to be confined.”118

D. Judge Stith’s Concurrence in Part, Dissent in Part
Judge Stith concurred in the denial of Count II, reiterating that
because Missouri citizens’ right to vote absentee is based on statute and
not the Missouri Constitution, citizens had not been deprived of a
constitutional right by the notary requirement.119 However, Judge Stith
dissented as to Count I and argued § 115.277.1(2) includes individuals,
such as the named Appellants, who expect to voluntarily confine
themselves on Election Day.120 With the belief that these individuals fall
within the meaning of “confinement due to illness” under § 115.277.1(2),
Judge Stith argued they could vote absentee without a notary or other
formal authorization.121
To bolster her dissent on Count I, Judge Stith provided a detailed
statutory interpretation of § 115.277.1(2).122 Judge Stith, like Judge
Wilson, focused on the language of the statute from the perspective of the
voter.123 Notably, Judge Stith focused on the phrase “expects to be
prevented from going to the polls due to … [i]ncapacity or confinement
due to illness. . . .” 124 Judge Stith argued that with the high prevalence of
COVID-19 in Missouri, voters have a reasonable expectation that they
may contract COVID-19 on Election Day or otherwise be required to
confine themselves due to contract tracing.125 Further, Judge Stith argued
117

Id. at 738.
Id. at 728 (majority opinion) (this opinion was published on October 9, 2020).
Judge Wilson cited Missouri’s “COVID-19 infection rates: more than 1,500 new cases
per day and projected that by election day, the number of Missourians infected by
COVID-19 was expected to reach 160,000. Id. at 738 (Wilson, J., concurring).
119
Id. at 739 (Stith, J., concurring).
120
Id.
121
Id. at 739.
122
Id. at 739–40.
123
Id. at 740.
124
Id.
125
Id. Contract tracing occurs when an individual is informed, they may have
been exposed to COVID-19 and they are required to monitor their health for signs and
symptoms, get tested, and self-isolate until the individual is certain they are not
infected due to this exposure. Contact Tracing, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Feb.
25, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/daily-life-coping/contacttracing.html [https://perma.cc/955D-WA4C] (select “Testing” from the left side
navigational tool bar; then select “Contact Tracing”).
118
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the plain language of § 115.277.1(2) would include individuals required
to quarantine because of personal illness or exposure, along with those
who are voluntarily confining due to the prevalence of the virus in the
community.126
In addition to the plain language of the statute, Judge Stith argued the
legislative history of § 115.277.1(2) proves the statute was meant to
include those who voluntarily confine themselves on Election Day.127
Although the legislature could not have precisely planned for the COVID19 pandemic, Judge Stith argued the history of the statute shows the
legislature anticipated situations where an individual could not vote due to
the elector’s risk of contracting an illness. 128 First, citing back to the first
absentee voting provision in Missouri enacted in 1917, Mo. Rev. Stat. §
471, the statute permitted absentee voting if the voter was otherwise
occupied by business or duties, without any mention of an illness.129 In
1939, the statute was amended to allow absentee voting if the voter
“expects” to be absent from their county on Election Day. 130 Then, in
1944, for the first time, the absentee statute mentioned “personally” being
prevented from going to the polls “through illness or disability.”131
Finally, in 1982, the legislature removed the clause which required the
elector to be personally prevented from going to the polls.132 Judge Stith
argued that if the legislature wanted to limit the power to vote absentee, it
would have done so in the various iterations of the statute. 133 Then, rather
than continue to amend § 471, the legislature enacted § 115.277.1(7),
which specifically identifies the situation where a voter is at-risk for
contracting, or has contracted, COVID-19.134 Judge Stith argued this
provision includes only the at-risk voters, separate from those covered by
§ 115.277.1(2).135 Therefore, she stated, individuals who voluntarily
confine themselves fall under subsection two.136
Judge Stith
acknowledged that some individuals qualify under both § 115.277.1(2)
and (7), but argued that these provisions should be read in pari materia –

126

NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 740 (Stith, J., concurring).
Id. at 741.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. (“Any … qualified elector … who expects to be absent … or any person
who through illness or physical disability expects to be prevented from personally
going to the polls . . . .”).
132
Id.
133
Id. at 741–42. Compare MO. REV. STAT. § 115.277 (1986), with MO. REV.
STAT. § 115.277 (2016).
134
NAACP v. State, 607 S.W.3d at 742 (Stith, J., concurring).
135
Id.
136
Id. at 745.
127
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in light of each other – to achieve their common purpose.137 Lastly, to
support her argument that the statute includes voluntary confinement,
Judge Stith noted several other states with similar provisions that, unlike
Missouri, enacted emergency regulations or executive orders expressly
declaring “confined due to illness” included individuals who voluntarily
confine themselves based on recommended guidelines, personal
avoidance, or attempts to reduce the spread of COVID-19.138

V. COMMENT
The COVID-19 pandemic swept the country by storm and demanded
prompt action by states and the nation as a whole. States took various
approaches to provide their citizens with the ability to vote absentee in a
manner that struck a balance between safe participation and election
integrity.139 Although one can only hope the hardships caused by COVID19 are an anomaly and will not recur in the future, the reality is our nation
is constantly facing new challenges that require adaptation. The decision
in NAACP v. State provides a roadmap for future litigation because the
factors set forth by the court provide guidance for future decisions where
the outcome depends on nuances contained in a statutory phrase.140

A. Missouri’s Gold Standard for Statutory Interpretation
The court articulated, first and foremost, that its gold standard for the
interpretation of a statute is to look at the “plain and ordinary meaning” of
the words.141 Although all three opinions clearly identified this method as
the preferred canon of interpretation – each judge separately beginning his
or her analysis with this principle – this technique provided little value
when the “plain” meaning seemingly differed from one judge to another.
The per curiam opinion went as far as citing Webster’s Dictionary to prove
the plain language.142 Further, by a simple shift in focus to a different
section of the statutory provision, this “plain and ordinary” meaning is
subject to manipulation and contrary interpretations.143 While the “plain
and ordinary” meaning of the words in a statute is likely the best place for
litigators to begin their analysis since this is what the court seemingly

137
Id. Judge Stith explained that if one statute is not listed as an exclusive
remedy, then both can be used. Id. at 743 (citing Director of Revenue v. Westinghouse
Credit Corp., 787 S.W.2d 715, 717–18 (Mo. 1990) (en banc)).
138
Id. at 744–45.
139
See id.
140
Id. at 728 (majority opinion).
141
Id. at 732.
142
Id. at 733 (citing Illness, Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary 1127 (3d ed. 2002)).
143
Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss4/11

16

Stout: Hindsight 20/20: Missouri’s Use of Statutory Interpretation as a

2021]

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN MISSOURI

1401

values the most, this canon may create more confusion if the words’ plain
meaning can be interpreted in various ways.144
The court also emphasized providing value to each provision the
legislature enacts, recognizing that legislators do not include meaningless
provisions.145 Taking this canon in a broader context, the court is likely to
find recent enactments not only persuasive for future interpretations but
“dispositive” of a statute’s meaning. This principle becomes especially
important during periods of crisis when new legislation is enacted in
response to an emergency.146 While the plain and ordinary meaning might
not always be clear, courts find legislators’ actions – creating and
implementing amendments – highly instructive for the purpose of
deciphering these new and existing provisions. 147 Further, as the court
implied in its opinion and as Judge Stith expressly stated in her
concurrence in part and dissent in part, newly enacted provisions must be
interpreted in harmony with existing provisions. 148 However, as shown by
the stark contrast between the per curiam ruling and the decision reached
by Judge Stith’s dissent in part, this harmonious interpretation is not
always helpful because judges dispute whether statutory provisions can
encompass overlapping categories.149
Perhaps most importantly, underlying the per curiam’s decision in
NAACP v. State was the consideration of future implications from the
court’s decision.150 The per curiam opinion mentioned in passing, while
critiquing Appellants’ broad interpretation of the provision, that allowing
individuals who voluntarily confine themselves to vote absentee could
result in a future where almost any Missouri registered voter could vote
absentee without a notary’s acknowledgement for the simple fear of
contracting the common cold.151 This passing remark cannot be
understated. Decisions by courts of any level have sweeping impacts, let
alone those of the highest court in the state. While fighting over the
interpretation of individual words, phrases, and enacted provisions is
helpful to decipher meaning, it is essential to understand the claims and
frame arguments in a way that will result in a positive impact for the future.
The legal system is based on precedent, and decisions interpreting state

144

Id.
Id.
146
See, e.g., id. at 734.
147
Missouri State Conference of Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored
People v. State, 607 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Mo. 2020).
148
Id. at 734, 743 (majority opinion) (Stith, J. concurring).
149
Id. at 743 (Stith, J., concurring).
150
Id. at 733–34 (majority opinion).
151
Id. at 733.
145
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statutes have far-reaching, rippling effects beyond the interpretation of
provisions in a specific dispute.152

B. “Ability” to Vote Absentee in Missouri
The court quickly decided the constitutional claims, which were
thoroughly briefed and argued by Appellants and the State by finding – in
unanimous agreement – Missouri citizens do not have a constitutional
right to vote absentee.153 Without any fundamental right, the court gave
immense deference to the legislature, as provided in § 115.302, to enact
measures to safeguard the voting process away from the polls.154 The
court’s narrow interpretation of absentee voting rights may have
increasing impacts on the future as the electorate ages. An aging
population creates more “at-risk” individuals who cannot obtain an
absentee ballot outside of the narrow Senate Bill 631 provision. 155 Courts
may face challenges as Missouri’s aging population raises similar
concerns and argues for the need to vote absentee based on health concerns
caused by crowded Election Day polling.156 The decision in NAACP v.
State indicates the court’s preference to respect the separation of powers
and grant broad discretion to the Missouri Legislature in order to protect
the integrity of elections. Safeguarding and authenticating votes clearly
comes at a cost. Individuals may expose themselves to vulnerable
situations, comprising their health for the sake of their right to vote. It is
an imperfect solution to the problem of balancing compelling rival
concerns. Nonetheless, if future disputes arise surrounding the expansion
of absentee voting provisions based on aging populations or unexpected
health crises, the court has guided litigants on ways to interpret these
provisions along with decisively ruling that the “right” to vote absentee is
best termed as the “ability” to vote absentee—a privilege conferred at the
discretion of the legislature.

152

See, e.g., id. at 733–34.
Id. at 735.
154
MO. REV. STAT. § 115.302 (2020).
155
S.B. 631, 100th Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess. § 115.277 (Mo. 2020) (“115.302. 1.
Any registered voter of this state may cast a mail-in ballot as provided in this section.
Nothing in this section shall prevent a voter from casting an absentee ballot, provided
such person has not cast a ballot pursuant to this section. Application for a mail-inballot may be made by the applicant in person, or by United States mail, or on behalf
of the applicant by his or her guardian or relative within the second degree of
consanguinity or affinity.”).
156
See Policy Academy State Profile, CMTY. LIVING (JUNE 18, 2012),
https://acl.gov/sites/default/files/programs/2016-11/Missouri.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5GKE-6XWP] (estimating that by 2030, 25% of Missouri’s
population will be above 60 years old).
153
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VI. CONCLUSION
So, what now? What importance does this opinion serve beyond the
context of voting in a pandemic? In NAACP v. State, the Supreme Court
of Missouri provided a clear explanation regarding the canons it uses to
interpret a statute. Recognizing and understanding which canons the court
finds most persuasive can help resolve future disputes and allow attorneys
to successfully advocate for their clients. Further, this decision clarifies
that Missouri voters do not have a constitutional right to vote absentee.
Instead, legislators hold the power to confer or restrict this privilege. As
the power to vote absentee without a notary’s authorization is clearly
within the discretion of the legislature, it is now more important than ever
for litigants recognize and apply the canons of interpretation the Supreme
Court of Missouri finds most persuasive to prevail in future disputes.
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